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Merger Policy and Industrial Policy
Keith Cowling*

The article by Adams and Brock1 is a welcome and important antidote to current government thinking about merger policy, both in the
United States and in Europe. In both regions, the government approach
presumes the efficiency-creating properties of mergers and, therefore,
adopts an extremely permissive stance. The declared imperative of international competitiveness echoes the view towards mergers which prevailed in Europe during the 1960s. Adams and Brock convincingly
demonstrate that the creation of the European industrial giants during
that decade was largely disastrous in efficiency terms. They also contrast
the European experience with that of Japan, where a similar merger wave
failed to materialize. The comparison points unambiguously to the superior efficiency-creating properties of the deconcentration tendencies
which generally prevailed within Japan, in some cases despite government policy to the contrary.
However, while the analysis of Adams and Brock is both important
and correct, I believe it is also incomplete. If bigness is a problem created largely by the laxity of past merger policy, then it is certainly correct
to argue for stricter merger policy now and in the future; yet such an
approach is unlikely to suffice. Not only is a policy required to control
the further growth in the dominance of the giant corporations, but the
problems posed by that very dominance must be addressed. I believe
those problems should not only be addressed as issues of regulation, but
also as issues of development. As democratic communities, we must react to the accumulated power of the major actors on the economic scene
by regulating their behavior or by divesting them of at least some of their
power. We must also act strategically to counterpose our own vision of
* Department of Economics, University of Warwick.

1 Adams & Brock, The Bigness Mystique and the MergerPolicy Debate An InternationalPerspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1 (1988).
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the future to that of the dominant corporations. Thus, the regulatory
and developmental roles of government are complementary in the search
for a dynamic and efficient economy, and these roles require the development of some sort of industrial policy.
Many will argue against an industrial policy that is anything more
than regulatory in character. Indeed, they will argue that the role of
government should be limited to allowing market forces to work more
effectively, rather than replacing them. Although there was a brief debate in the United States in the early 1980s concerning broader and
deeper versions of industrial policy, this rapidly subsided in the face of
the standard neoclassical arguments, coupled with a tangible improvement in the economy.2 Nevertheless, the problem of the lack of dynamism in the United States and European industrial economies remains.
In the United States, the problem is manifested as a huge balance of trade
deficit coupled with a very poor record of productivity growth; in Europe, a full employment growth path appears difficult to achieve because
of the potential trade imbalances and inflation that could result. For example, the recent dash for growth in the United Kingdom has quickly
come to a juddering halt as the government has reacted to a trade deficit
proportionately larger than even that of the United States. The only major industrial nation to have achieved the twin goals of full employment
and rapid productivity growth in recent years has been Japan.3 I believe
that the Japanese example is as important in assessing the relevance of
industrial policy as it was for Adams and Brock in assessing merger
policy.
Just as there are systemic arguments for relying on market forces to
play a central role in modern economies-arguments which are now vigorously espoused even within the centrally-planned economies-so there
are parallel arguments for imposing on these market forces a coherent
national economic planning system, within which market forces are allowed to operate. At present, there seem to be three fundamental reasons
for imposing a coherent national economic planning system: transnationalism, short-termism and centripetalism. All of these reasons are related
to the underlying concentration of power and, therefore, decision-making, which Adams and Brock have highlighted.4
2 See, eg., Norton, Industrial Policy and American Renewal, 24 J. ECON. LrrERATURE 1
(1986).
3 See Glyn & Rowthorn, West European Unemployment: Corporatism and Structural Change,
78 AM. ECON. REv. 194-99 (1988) (Papers and Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American
Economic Association.
4 For an extended discussion of these issues, see Lecture by K. Cowling, Planning, the Market
and Industrial Policy, The Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary (April, 1988).
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The growth in dominance of the transnational corporation poses a
significant potential threat for any national market economy. The global
perspective and ambitions of the major industrial and financial corporations may cut across the interests of any particular nation-state. The fundamental issue relates to the asymmetry of power between corporation
and community, which derives from the transnationality of the corporation compared with the locational rigidity of a specific national community. Any one nation can be deindustrialized by the actions of
transnational corporations. Therefore, to protect itself, any national
community must intervene in the strategy-making of the transnationals-or accept their dominance in its own affairs. Without such intervention, the strategy of the transnationals will become the national strategy,
and this may have little correspondence to what is best for the nation.
The second basis for national economic planning is the systemic
short-termism of the market. In this context, it is often argued that financial institutions adopt a peculiarly short-term perspective with regard
to investment. What this generally means is that while incremental
change can be handled quite well by market institutions, more fundamental changes involving quantum leaps in product, process or structure
will not be handled so well. An active market for corporate control allows the short-term perspective of financial institutions to impinge much
more decisively on the perspective of industry and is hardly conducive to
the rational planning of the long-term future of the industrial base.
Short-term decision making is crowding out long-term issues. No one is
planning for the future within such market economies, so we need to
establish mechanisms and institutions to do so.
The third basis for planning relates to the tendency for higher level
activities and occupations to gravitate to the center. This has led to the
loss of a substantial degree of local, regional, and, in some cases, national
autonomy, with strategic decisions having major implications for such
communities being made outside those communities. The same centralizing forces imply a siphoning-off of resources to the center, which
reduces the capacity of the periphery to sustain its own economic, political and cultural development.
Thus, we have identified three central tendencies within modem
market economies: transnationalism, short-termism and centripetalism.
When taken together, these tendencies point to the need for national economic planning in order to achieve efficiency in the allocation and utilization of national economic resources. Economic power is being
concentrated in fewer and fewer hands and this in turn is generating
forces which progressively undermine the ability of people, and the com-
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munities of which they are part, to assert their right to determine their
own future. This is the essence of democracy-the ability of people and
their communities to allocate resources in the way they choose. Thus,
economic democracy is fundamental to maximizing a community's economic welfare.
To begin to achieve economic democracy, people and communities
must possess some significant degree of direct control over the dominant
centers of economic power. They must possess regulatory control, and
also the capacity and power to develop effective plans for the economic
development of the community or nation as a whole. In theory, this requirement for economic democracy fits very easily within neoclassical
economics since the neoclassical view focuses upon individuals making
choices. In practice, however, it tends to cut across the grain of neoclassical analysis, which assumes an even distribution of power, ignores
asymmetries of power, and, therefore, fails to encompass the requirement
for democracy within the functioning of the economy.
However, while it is possible on theoretical grounds to argue for
national economic planning to secure an efficient allocation of resources,
many economists, and others, are quite naturally skeptical about the
whole project. The world is littered with failed and disreputable planning systems. It is quite clear that under modem economic conditions,
comprehensive centralized planning is both infeasible and undesirable.
But all is not lost, for at least one major industrial country has evolved a
planning system which has worked with enormous success. Like Adams
and Brock, but now focussing more broadly on industrial policy, we turn
to the case of Japan.
Japan is the most important example of a government taking a central developmental role in the economy without directly owning most of
the productive assets. Although various departments and agencies of the
state are involved in industrial strategy, the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry ("MITI") has a central and dominant role.5 MITI
targets certain key industries chosen after wide-ranging consultation and
discussion, and works to ensure, by a variety of interventions, that those
sectors grow rapidly and efficiently. The planning has been strategic,
but, wherever possible, has been based on some notion of consensus. The
Japanese recognized early that static comparative advantage was not an
adequate basis for national economic development. To branch into other
areas of economic activity required that the state be directly involved; the
market could not be relied upon. The market had to be managed and
5 See generally C. JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982).
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directed, while nevertheless leaving it to do what it does best: looking
after the myriad incremental changes required within the broad strategy,
and of course running all the sectors which did not require strategic
intervention.
The success of the Japanese economy is obvious-but how much of
this success is the result of government planning? Adams and Brock appear to take the view that MITI was playing an entirely negative role and
that it was only the resistance of industry to MITI's strategy that allowed
the economy to express its true potential. MITI certainly made mistakes
and its pursuit of giantism was misplaced, yet it would seem wrong to
conclude from this that MITI did not have a major positive impact on
the Japanese economy. Without a coherent, proactive industrial policy, I
fear that the Japanese economy would have been dominated by outside
interests, primarily from the United States. Developing national economic autonomy was essential to the transformation of the Japanese
economy into the modem, dynamic industrial economy it is today, and a
coherent industrial policy was a necessary but insufficient condition for
achieving just that.
What is important to learn from the Japanese experience is not the
detail of instruments, institutions and mechanisms-which may not be
easily transplanted-but rather their approach to the problem. To attain
similar success in the economies of the United States and Europe will
require the same degree of government commitment to economic development as has been the case in Japan. The message of the Japanese experience is that, properly organized, strategic planning and the market are
complements rather than substitutes. Each must be allocated its appropriate role.
While Adams and Brock make a compelling case for concluding
that merger-induced bigness is bad, the logic of that position demands
not only a stringent merger policy to prevent further deterioration in the
situation, but also further action to help remedy the current position.
The argument presented in this brief Article suggests that to address adequately the current position, a government not only needs to take a
strong regulatory approach toward merger and monopoly, but must also
adopt a vigorous developmental approach. This conclusion is based
upon the theory that the systemic, negative effects of transnationalism,
short-termism and centripetalism cannot be fully countered by a purely
reactive policy, but instead require a complementary proactive one. The
suggested role model is Japan, which based its own developmental policy
on the nineteenth century United States experience. The need for a similar commitment to a proactive industrial policy in the late-twentieth cen-
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tury United States will become increasingly evident over the next few
years as the country begins to grapple with its present trade imbalance.
It is important that the problem is not seen simply in terms of a
macroeconomic adjustment, but rather that such adjustment is complemented by a long-term supply side policy-an active industrial policy.
The same is true in Europe, which has been plagued by continuing high
levels of unemployment. Adams and Brock are absolutely correct in recognizing that an industrial policy based on giantism is no way forward.
Japan, in contrast and perhaps fortuitously, has demonstrated that industrial policy in conjunction with deconcentration is a winning formula.
We can all learn from that experience.

